Abstract-Shannon theoretic secret key generation by several parties is considered for models in which a secure noisy channel with multiple input and output terminals and a public noiseless channel of unlimited capacity are available for accomplishing this goal. The secret key is generated for a set of terminals of the noisy channel, with the remaining terminals (if any) cooperating in this task through their public communication. Single-letter lower and upper bounds for secrecy capacities are obtained when secrecy is required from an eavesdropper that observes only the public communication and perhaps also a set of terminals disjoint from . These bounds coincide in special cases, but not in general. We also consider models in which different sets of terminals share multiple keys, one for the terminals in each set with secrecy required from the eavesdropper as well as from the terminals not in this set. Partial results include showing links among the associated secrecy capacity region for multiple keys, the transmission capacity region of the multiple access channel defined by the secure noisy channel, and achievable rates for a single secret key for all the terminals.
involve either a discrete memoryless multiple source (DMMS) with two components accessible to one terminal each, or a discrete memoryless channel (DMC) with one input terminal and one output terminal. In both types of models, an additional "wiretapped" terminal may or may not be present. The sizable literature on such models includes Maurer [18] , Bennett, Brassard, Crépeau, and Maurer [4] , Csiszár [6] , Maurer and Wolf [19] , [20] , Csiszár and Narayan [9] , [10] , Renner and Wolf [21] , Gohari and Anantharam [12] , [13] and a comprehensive treatment in Csiszár and Körner [8] . A single-letter characterization of the secrecy capacity-the largest rate at which a secret key can be generated-is known in special cases, e.g., when a wiretapped terminal is absent or when the wiretapped terminal reveals itself to the parties generating secrecy.
In our previous work, we had studied secrecy generation for a multiterminal source model where each participating terminal had access to one component of a DMMS [9] , [10] , and for a multiterminal channel model which involved an underlying DMC with a single input and multiple outputs [10] ; in both models, unrestricted and noiseless public communication between the terminals was permitted, to which the eavesdropper had full access. In this paper, which constitutes a continuation of our work in [10] and [11] , we examine channel models for secrecy generation which involve an underlying DMC with multiple inputs and outputs. Terminals govern the inputs and terminals observe the corresponding outputs. Following each transmission of symbols by the input terminals over the DMC, communication over a public noiseless channel of unlimited capacity is allowed between all the terminals, which may be interactive and which is observed by all the terminals. 1 The goal is to generate secret common randomness shared by a given set of terminals at the largest rate possible. Thus, the resulting key must be accessible to every terminal in . It need not be accessible to the terminals not in , but nor is it required to be concealed from them, with the possible exception of a set of terminals which are "wiretapped" by the eavesdropper (where ). A DMC input terminal may or may not belong to the set or .
We restrict ourselves to models where all the terminals cooperate, including those that are wiretapped (if ), in generating a secret key for the terminals in , with secrecy being required from the eavesdropper that has access to only the public communication and the information available to the wiretapped terminals in . Also, we assume the eavesdropper to be passive, i.e., unable to tamper with the communication of the legitimate terminals.
We do not address models with wiretap side information in which the underlying DMC also has an additional output terminal that is wiretapped by the eavesdropper and does not co-operate in secrecy generation (cf., e.g., [1] , [9] , [10] , [12] , [13] , [17] , [19] , and [21] ).
The problem of secrecy generation for a general multiterminal channel model studied in this paper appears more difficult than its special case for a channel with a single input. Single-letter characterizations of secrecy capacities for the latter have been given in [10] . For the general channel model, short of providing single-letter characterizations of secrecy capacities, our main contributions are the following. One possible operational strategy in a channel model as above is source emulation which entails the channel input terminals (in the case when none is wiretapped) transmitting independent sequences of random variables (rvs) over the DMC with the output terminals observing the corresponding output sequences. In addition to this "simple" source emulation, we introduce also "general" source emulation that allows certain correlations among the rvs assigned to different input terminals even when none is wiretapped. The emulated source model leads to our achievability results which furnish lower bounds for the secrecy capacities in Theorem 4, using simple protocols. While our definition of general source emulation admits correlations between the input terminals, in the protocols that achieve our lower bounds, the input terminals operate independently of each other with each terminal transmitting independent sequences that need not be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). Our converse results provide upper bounds for the secrecy capacities using familiar techniques from Shannon theory, but are difficult and rely on two entropy inequalities from our previous work [10] which may be of independent interest. Our lower and upper bounds coincide only in special cases. While it is conceivable that our lower bounds could be always tight, the upper bounds are not so; evidence of the latter is shown by an improved upper bound for a class of channels.
We also consider multiterminal channel models in which different subsets of terminals share multiple keys, one for terminals in each set with secrecy required from the eavesdropper as well as from the terminals not in . The main objective is to draw attention to the challenging problems in this realm that remain unresolved. Here, simple results are presented showing links among the associated secrecy capacity region for multiple keys, the transmission capacity region of the multiple access channel (MAC) defined by the DMC, and achievable rates for a single secret key shared by a subset of the terminals.
Our problem formulations are described in Section II. Section III treats secrecy generation for DMCs with a single output based on elementary considerations. Our general single-letter lower and upper bounds for secrecy capacities are presented in Sections IV and V, respectively. We illustrate our results and their limitations by four examples of secrecy generation in simple multiterminal channel models in Section VI. A closing discussion is contained in Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
All rvs are assumed to take values in finite sets, even if not stated explicitly. An rv will be denoted by an uppercase letter and its range by the corresponding script capital unless stated otherwise. The cardinality of a finite set is denoted by .
Logarithms are with respect to the base 2. For integers , we denote . We consider multiterminal channel models of the following kind. Terminals , with finite alphabets , are connected to terminals , with finite alphabets , respectively, by a DMC . Terminals govern the inputs of the DMC over which they transmit securely sequences of length , while terminals observe the corresponding output sequences of length . In between consecutive symbol transmissions over the DMC (with instantaneous receptions), the terminals in are allowed to communicate over a public noiseless channel of unlimited capacity. In any transmission or communication by a terminal, randomization is permitted. The public communication is observed by all the terminals in as well as by an eavesdropper.
We shall assume that each terminal generates at the outset a rv to be used for randomization; the rvs are mutually independent. Every input terminal transmits symbols over the DMC at time instants , and every output terminal observes the corresponding output symbols . In addition, communication among the terminals in over the public channel occurs-possibly interactively and in several rounds-during the time intervals , for , and immediately following , which hereafter will be referred to simply as intervals . [9] will be used. Given , a rv is -recoverable from if for some function of . For rvs and , to be interpreted as representing a secret key and the eavesdropper's knowledge, respectively, the information theoretic security index is Smallness of this security index is tantamount jointly to a nearly uniform distribution for (i.e., is small) and to the near independence of and (i.e., the mutual information is close to 0). 
By definition, an -SK is recoverable at the terminals in , and is nearly uniformly distributed and effectively concealed from an eavesdropper with access to the public communication ; it need not be concealed from the terminals in . On the other hand, an -PK for is effectively concealed from an eavesdropper with access-in addition to the public communication -also to a set of "wiretapped" or "compromised" terminals. This -PK need not be concealed from the terminals in . Note that the compromised terminals can cooperate in the secrecy generation through their public communication. Indeed, it can be assumed without loss of generality (w.l.o.g.) that the terminals in reveal publicly all the information in their possession (which, anyway, is accessible to the eavesdropper). This assumption will be made usually without explicit mention. Remark: Our converse proofs stand under the requirement of "weak" secrecy, i.e., while decays to 0 [1] , [17] . The achievability results hold with both and decaying to 0 exponentially rapidly thereby affording "strong" secrecy [6] , [8] , [18] .
In general, any number of DMC input and output terminals may be wiretapped (barring two terminals to avoid the trivial). However, it is obvious that the wiretapped input terminals (if any) can be coalesced, as can the wiretapped output terminals. The next lemma shows that attention can be restricted even to such models in which no input terminal, and at most one output terminal, is wiretapped. Nevertheless, we shall find it convenient throughout to adhere to the original model above and take recourse only occasionally to the following reduction lemma. Remark: By the Lemma, any channel model with at most one uncompromised input terminal can be reduced to a model with just one input terminal; for the latter, a single-letter solution for PK capacity is available ([10, Th.
4.1]).
Proof: We can assume w.l.o.g. that . Indeed, by the passage preceding the Lemma, it can be assumed that either or , and in the former case, formally a compromised output terminal, can be added at which the output is a constant. Then, we shall prove the Lemma with . The compromised input terminal will be eliminated by merging it with an uncompromised one (if any, i.e., if ), while keeping track of it by letting the -output of contain an identical copy of the compromised input of .
Formally, assuming , in case (when ), let , , and if . In case (when ), the only modification needed is to set . The input -tuples of are identified in an obvious manner with input -tuples of , and output -tuples of are regarded as being obtained by appending a symbol to the output -tuples of . The definition of is
In other words, the DMC behaves as but additionally transmits noiselessly the input of terminal of to the terminal of . Thus, the single wiretapped terminal of will possess the same information as the wiretapped terminals of . It follows that each protocol for and gives rise to a protocol for and with identical secrecy performance, and also reciprocally so.
We shall also consider models in which different subsets of the terminals in share multiple keys, one for the terminals in each subset with privacy from the remaining terminals in that are not members of that subset. Remark: The PK capacity region is a closed convex set. The former is clear from the definition, while the latter is a consequence of a standard time-sharing argument.
III. MODELS WITH SINGLE OUTPUT
In this section, we consider DMCs with a sole output for which simple results are presented that do not require any sophisticated tools.
Let be a DMC with input terminals and one output terminal, and let be any set of terminals of size which contains the output terminal . Denote by the (average error) capacity region of the MAC , and by its projection on the -dimensional subspace of spanned by the coordinate axes . Furthermore, consider the PK capacity region for the pairs of terminals .
Proposition 2:
For and as earlier, it holds that i) ; ii) any such that the -dimensional vector belongs to , is a lower bound for the PK capacity .
Corollary: It holds that
Furthermore, any such that can be achieved as an SK rate for or PK rate for with privacy from , with no public communication by the input terminals and with only the output terminal sending a public message.
Proof: i) By definition, each arises from some by deleting the components with ; it can be supposed w.l.o.g. that all these deleted components are equal to 0. It is easy to see that an achievable rate tuple for transmission over a MAC , in which some components are 0, can be achieved by codes whose message sets corresponding to the zero rates are singletons (rather than merely of subexponential size In Section VI, we shall give an example where the trivial inner bound for the PK capacity region and the lower bounds for the SK capacity , both above, are tight. It remains open whether they are tight in general. Here, we present a weaker result than the tightness of the lower bounds for in the Corollary of Theorem 2, and which is straightforward.
Proposition 3: For any 2 , the SK capacity is positive iff there exists such that for each . Proof: Sufficiency is obvious by the Corollary of Proposition 2. For necessity, note that if no as above exists, then-using the convexity of -for some , we must have that for every . The latter means that does not depend on , and this would imply that the SK capacity is 0 even if the terminals in were allowed to communicate securely among themselves. For a formal proof, note that upon regarding the terminals in as a consolidated party , any use of the DMC amounts to a randomization performed by party (since the choice of channel input at terminal does not influence the output). However, it is well known that two parties (here and ), with no resources other than the ability of randomization and of public communication, cannot generate an SK; see, for example, [17] . We conclude this section by commenting on the possible relationship between SK capacity and the feedback capacity region of a MAC, which may properly contain [5] . Specifically, focusing for simplicity on the case , the Corollary of Proposition 2 suggests a comparison of the SK capacity with
In the secrecy setting, full feedback is ruled out as the feedback communication is public. Still, if a coding scheme with partial feedback could be found by which the gain in transmission rates exceeds the information leakage due to feedback, it would lead to an SK rate larger than that in the Corollary of Proposition 2, even if it were less than . The existence of such a scheme is unknown; the Cover-Leung scheme [5] does not appear to admit a modification with this property. While no evidence is available that might be an achievable SK rate, nor do we know, in general, even whether . In Section V, the latter bound will be shown to hold for a class of MACs with two input terminals, for which a single-letter characterization of the feedback capacity region is available.
IV. GENERAL LOWER BOUNDS FOR SK AND PK CAPACITIES
Our techniques developed in [10] will be used to derive bounds for SK and PK capacities for the general DMC model introduced in Section II. Our results are partial; unlike in [10] , the lower bounds in this section and the upper bounds in the next section agree only in special cases.
One way to generate an SK or a PK for a multiterminal channel model is by simple source emulation. If the input terminals in use i.i.d. repetitions of a -tuple of rvs , such that the assigned to the nonwiretapped terminals are conditionally independent given , the DMC will generate i.i.d. repetitions of an -tuple of rvs , whose joint probability mass function (pmf) is given by (3) with each output terminal observing i.i.d. repetitions of . Clearly, achievable SK rates for the source model defined by will be achievable for the channel model, as well.
A general form of source emulation entails the use of an auxiliary source. Let us consider the PK generation problem with a given set of wiretapped terminals; SK generation obtains as the special case . Let be a (finite) auxiliary alphabet, and consider rvs such that has an arbitrary joint pmf, and the , , are conditionally independent given . Moreover, let , represent the outputs of the DMC corresponding to input , satisfying the Markov condition (4) so that the pmf of is (5) where . An associated source model is defined by assigning rvs and , with a joint pmf as above, to terminals , letting the set of wiretapped terminals be . Clearly, this source model can be emulated by our given multiterminal channel model. First, the rvs with an arbitrarily specified joint pmf are generated by one of the input terminals and revealed as required by the source model (since ). Then, the terminals can generate the rvs conditionally independently given , and use them as their channel inputs while the rvs , are used as channel inputs by the corresponding terminals. These inputs, in turn, give rise to the channel outputs . The single-letter formulas available for the SK and PK capacities of a source model [9] , [10] afford lower bounds for the corresponding capacities of the multiterminal channel model, as the suprema of SK or PK capacities of source models obtainable by simple or general source emulation as above. These lower bounds will be stated formally in Theorem 4.
As in [10] , given any set of size , we denote by the family of all nonempty sets that do not contain , and by the set of all -dimensional vectors , with , that satisfy
Also, if a set is given, and are defined analogously, restricting to subsets of and replacing (6) by (7) In the parlance of combinatorics, the vectors in (resp. ) are fractional partitions of (resp. ) into members of (resp. ) (cf. e.g., [15] ). The following quantities will play an important role: (8) and (9) for rvs (the latter with values in some finite set ), and vectors in (resp. ). We assume throughout, without further explicit mention, that the Markov condition (4) holds and that the pmf of is compatible with the given DMC , i.e., (10) We denote by and the special cases for of (8) and (9), respectively. The quantities above are related to and defined in ([10, eqs. (6) and (7)]) for a DMC with a single input and outputs, with denoting the input pmf. In order to apply the results of [10] , we consider in the following an auxiliary channel model with underlying DMC (the input alphabet being any finite set), which is defined by a DMC as (11) Note that the sets and corresponding to the original model (including when are the same as and corresponding to the auxiliary model with , where the fictitious terminal 0 depicts the input to the DMC (as also ). The rvs and can be regarded, respectively, as the input and output of the DMC ; in other words, they represent a source model that can be emulated by the auxiliary channel model iff their joint pmf is of the form (10) with (12) This source model can be emulated by the original channel model iff the rvs are conditionally independent given . For rvs satisfying (10) and (12), the quantities in (8) and (9) can be written equivalently in the notation of ([10, eqs. (6) and (7)]) as (13) (14) with the right sides meant for the underlying DMC . Hence, by [10, Th. 4.1], the minimum of with respect to is the PK capacity of the source model defined by , with privacy from terminal 0; furthermore, maximization over yields the PK capacity of the auxiliary channel model with underlying DMC . A similar statement holds for , with privacy from the terminals in . Furthermore, by [10, Th. 4.2], for the auxiliary channel model, these PK rates are achievable by protocols such that terminal 0 transmits a deterministic sequence, and public communication takes place only after transmission over the DMC has been completed and consists of public messages by the terminals in with at most one message from each terminal that is a (deterministic) function of the DMC outputs therein. Note that as a consequence of their operational meaning, the quantities in (13) and (14) are nonnegative.
Theorem 4:
For any , and conditionally independent given (15) Similarly, for any and such that , are conditionally independent given (16) Moreover, the right sides yield the largest SK or PK rates achievable by general source emulation using a particular choice of . These rates are achievable with a noninteractive communication protocol in which the input terminals operate independently of each other, with the terminals in transmitting deterministic sequences over the DMC and those in transmitting independent sequences that are not necessarily i.i.d.
Comments:
1) The maxima of the right sides of (15) and (16) with respect to the choice of are achieved since the cardinality of the range of can be bounded by standard techniques.
2) The largest SK or PK rates achievable by simple source emulation are obtained by a similar maximization of or . Proof: As discussed previously in Theorem 4, the righthand side of (15) is an achievable PK rate, in the auxiliary channel model with underlying DMC , for the set of terminals with privacy from the input terminal 0; moreover, it is achievable by a protocol of the mentioned special kind that, in particular, has terminal 0 transmitting a deterministic sequence . The latter circumstance can be realized in the model with DMC with the input terminals simply transmitting mutually independent rvs , with pmfs , noting that it is at this point that the conditional independence hypothesis is used.
It follows, referring again to the preceding discussion, that the right-hand side of (15) is an achievable SK rate for the channel model with DMC , by means of communication protocols admitting public communication only upon completion of the DMC transmissions and with each terminal sending at most one public message that is a function of alone. To complete the proof of Theorem 4 in respect of (15) , it remains to show that the DMC input terminals need not send public messages, to which end it may be necessary to change the pmfs of the input rvs . This can be shown exactly as the analogous assertion of [10, Th. 2] was proved. Consider a "good" protocol in which the terminals send public messages . Proceeding as in the cited proof (replacing there with ), it follows that the protocol will remain "good" if the joint pmf of all -length channel inputs is changed to its conditional joint pmf under the condition that the values of are equal to suitable constants. This conditioning does not affect the independence of the inputs (although their components no longer need be independent), and it reduces the public messages of the input terminals to be constants.
The assertion concerning (16) is proved in the same manner; this time, we define an auxiliary channel model with the role of assigned to . It is obvious from the definition (9) of that its value remains unchanged if is replaced by .
Next, restricting attention to a MAC with a single output whose capacity region is , by the Corollary of Theorem 2, the condition is sufficient for to be an achievable SK rate for . While it remains unclear whether this condition is necessary, the next Proposition shows that larger SK rates cannot be achieved by means of general source emulation.
Proposition 5: For a MAC
, a necessary and sufficient condition for the achievability of SK rate with by general source emulation is . Comment: A similar argument shows that is achievable as an SK rate by simple source emulation iff belongs to a polyhedron where are i.i.d. rvs and . Since the capacity region equals the convex closure of the union of all such polyhedra, where the union itself may be nonconvex, this shows that for some MACs, general source emulation can yield larger SK rates than simple source emulation; see Example 3 in Section VI as follows.
Proof: Consider general source emulation involving an auxiliary rv and input rvs that are conditionally independent given , and let be the corresponding output rv. By Theorem 4, the SK rate achievable by this source emulation is . Since are conditionally independent given , and , the expression for in (8) simplifies. Specifically (17) for (18) and for (19) Substituting (17)- (19) into (8), and using for each , we obtain (20) For any fixed , assign defined by if or for some , and otherwise. With this , (20) gives It follows that satisfies (21) for every , proving the necessity part of the assertion.
For sufficiency, note that means that for some and conditionally independent given with , the inequalities (21) are satisfied. For these rvs, (20) and (21) give Since and , this proves that .
V. GENERAL UPPER BOUNDS FOR SK AND PK CAPACITIES
In order to state our upper bounds for and , we extend the notation in (8) and (9) above with a slight abuse of it. Specifically, for rvs , and for or , we denote (22) (23) and denote by and the special cases for constant of (22) and (23), respectively. As earlier, we assume that the rvs satisfy the Markov condition and . Akin to and in (13) and (14), both and , too, are nonnegative, as shown in Appendix B.
Theorem 6:
The SK capacity for a set of terminals and the PK capacity for with privacy from a set of terminals are bounded above, respectively, as follows: (24) and for any (25) Furthermore, in the single output case , provided that the output is not compromised, i.e., and , respectively, we get as in [10, inequality (11) ] that for every (28) where A main ingredient of the proof of (25) will be to show that the expression within above is bounded above by (29) for . This implication is a generalization of the fact proved in [10] that the bracketed expression in (11) therein was bounded above by (12) . Accordingly, the proof of the claimed implication here is similar to, but more complicated than, the corresponding proof in [10] . This proof, provided in Appendix A, required a new idea in establishing (A8).
To simplify (29), a standard technique is used: Let be an auxiliary rv distributed uniformly on and independent of , and set . Then, , etc., and it holds that and . Finally, omitting the tildes, we obtain for the new from (28), (29) (and recalling (9) , (23) ) that (30) for every and . The claimed upper bound for PK rates in (25) follows thereupon.
Turning to the special case and , note that the last term in (25) vanishes. For , since , we have in (25), by (9) and (23) , that (31) Now, for , in the summand in the right-hand side of (31), the expression within equals
while for , it equals (33) By (32), (33), and using , it follows that the right-hand side of (31) equals , thereby leading to (26).
Proof of Corollary: Under the hypothesis of the Corollary, , and the last term in (25) also vanishes, trivially when , and upon taking to be the uncompromised input otherwise. Hence, in this case, (25) gives the upper bound which coincides with the lower bound in Theorem 4.
The upper bounds in Theorem 6 are not tight, in general, but only in special cases do refinements in the proof seem to yield improvements of interest. This is illustrated by the next theorem where the bound mentioned in Section III is established for a class of MACs with two inputs and one output. In the remainder of this section, , and is denoted by .
Consider the Willems' class of two-input, one-output MACs with the property that input 1 is determined uniquely by input 2 and the output, i.e., there exists a mapping such that if . For this class of MACs, Willems [22] proved that the capacity region with feedback is equal to the Cover-Leung region [5] . Thus, for a MAC in class , if and only if there exist rvs whose joint pmf factorizes as (34) and Consequently, the largest with is given by (35) with the maximum taken over rvs satisfying (34). Note that the range of the rv can be assumed to have a specified cardinality, and so the maximum in (35) is attained.
Theorem 7:
For a MAC in class , it holds that . Proof: A slight refinement of the proof of Theorem 6, specialized to the case , shows that the expression within in (28) now is bounded above by See (A15) in Appendix A. In particular, the terms corresponding to the sets that contain the output terminal 3 are equal to 0. As in the proof of Theorem 6, this sum can be rewritten as where with being distributed uniformly on . Then the Markov relation holds and, moreover, and are conditionally independent given . The latter follows by the dependence balance bound technique of Hekstra and Willems [14] . Indeed, Lemma C in Appendix C implies that Hence, using the trivial bound , it follows from (28) that the maximum, subject to (34), of is an upper bound for . Finally, for the existence of with specified , the inequalities are necessary and sufficient. Subject to these conditions, the minimum above is attained when two of are zero, and either or or according to whether the first, the second, or the third mutual information term is the smallest. Recalling (35), the proof is completed. The achievability of an SK rate of 0.5 can be seen also separately by the following explicit scheme which generates 1 bit of perfect SK (i.e., -SK with for by means of independent transmissions over the DMC by the input terminals using symbols followed by public communication only by the output terminal. [23] . The exact value of the SK capacity is unknown.
VI. EXAMPLES
Next, consider PK generation for with privacy from . Noting in (16) that the only permissible choice of is , we get that the righthand side of (16), with conditionally independent of , equals . Thus, by Theorem 4, it follows that with the previous maximum attained by . Thus, the largest PK rate achievable by general source emulation is 0.5. The exact value of the PK capacity remains unknown, for Theorem 6 yields only the trivial upper bound 1. Example 1] . Furthermore, in the explicit scheme provided therein, the key generated for satisfies the secrecy condition (2) for with , thereby constituting a perfect PK for with privacy from in addition to being a perfect SK for . Thus, we have , too. For the special case , the achievability of an SK rate of can be seen also separately by the following explicit scheme which generates 1 bit of perfect SK for by means of independent transmissions over the DMC by the input terminals using symbols followed by public communication only by the output terminals but not by the input terminals. Specifically, the input terminal transmits over the DMC a sequence with being -valued w.p. and ; all such sequences are mutually independent. The output terminal sends a public message which is the block excluding , while the output terminal sends the public message where the additions are modulo 2. It is easily seen that , say, is perfectly recoverable from and the public communication . Furthermore, satisfies the secrecy condition (1) with , and so constitutes a perfect SK of rate . We have considered secrecy generation for multiaccess channel models whose resources consist of facilities for secure noisy channel transmission from the input to the output terminals, public noiseless communication among all the terminals, and (mutually independent) randomization at the terminals. Our main results are single-letter lower and upper bounds for SK and PK capacities, in Theorems 4 and 6, which agree in special cases but not in general. The general channel model considered here appears more defiant than its special case with a single input for which single-letter characterizations of SK and PK capacities were found in [10] .
A familiar technique for approaching channel secrecy problems is by means of source emulation. For instance, the available results on the oblivious transfer capacity of simple channel models are obtained by this technique [2] . Regarding secrecy capacities of channel models, they are known to be achievable by simple source emulation in the case of a single input terminal [10] . For multiple input terminals, the general source emulation introduced in this paper can strictly outperform simple source emulation even for models with a single output terminal. Note that the achievability results proved by means of general source emulation in Theorem 4 use very simple protocols.
We show for a MAC model with a single output, in which all the terminals seek to share secrecy, a necessary and sufficient condition for to be an achievable SK rate by general source emulation is that must lie in the capacity region of the MAC; thus, the maximum SK rate achievable by source emulation is the largest such in the MAC capacity region. A main open question for this special model, as well as for the general channel model, is whether secrecy rates can be achieved beyond those attainable by the simple protocols entailed by general source emulation, by resorting to the complex protocols described in Section II. Even for the special case of Example 2, this question remains unresolved. However, for this case, the general upper bound of Theorem 6 is bettered by that of Theorem 7. where the inequality holds since is a function of and so is determined by . Furthermore, since implies so that in the right side of (A10) (A11) Combining (A9), (A10), and (A11), we get that is bounded above as (A12) Now, we observe in the right side of (A12) that the summands in the first and second sums, respectively, are Finally, from (A12), (A13), and (A14), we get that for every which is (A8). where the conditional entropy is unaltered by further conditioning on the past, we obtain (A15)
APPENDIX B
The proof of the nonnegativity of (23) relies on the following technical lemma; that of (22) Comment: Lemma B is a special case of Lemma B1 in [10] and also of Theorem 1 in [16] .
Proof: We have
The claimed nonnegativity of (23) follows upon taking and in Lemma B. This lemma also provides a formal proof of the nonnegativity of (8) and (9), with .
APPENDIX C
Lemma C: For a MAC with two inputs and one output, and any protocol 3 as in Section II, it holds for that (C1)
Proof: First we show that (C2)
Recall that the communication in interval equals a sequence of messages sent consecutively by the terminals in rounds. If message is sent by terminal 1, then since is a function of and the prior communication . The inequality follows similarly when is sent by terminal 2, and holds with equality when is sent by terminal 3 for then is a function of . The validity of these inequalities for implies (C2). The assertion (C1) follows from (C2) and the inequality (C3)
The latter is a version of the dependence balance bound [14, eq. (1)]; note that the conditioning on here does not affect the proof.
